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Abstract
First-order logic is typically presented as the study of deduc-
tion in a setting with elementary quantification. In this paper,
we take another vantage point and conceptualize first-order
logic as a linear space that encodes “plausibility". Whereas a
deductive perspective emphasizes how (i.e., process), a space
perspective emphasizes where (i.e., location). We explore
several consequences that a shift in perspective to “signals
in space" has for first-order logic, including (1) a notion
of proof based on orthogonal decomposition, (2) a method
for assigning probabilities to sentences that reflects logical
uncertainty, and (3) a “models as boundary" principle that
relates the models of a theory to its “size".
Keywords first-order logic, linear space, logical uncertainty,
distributive normal form
1 Introduction
The inspiration for this paper has its origins in Pólya’s writ-
ings on plausible reasoning [31–33].
Finished mathematics presented in a finished
form appears as purely demonstrative, consist-
ing of proofs only. Yet mathematics in the mak-
ing resembles any other human knowledge in
the making. You have to guess a mathematical
theorem before you can prove it; you have to
guess the idea of the proof before you carry
through the details. You have to combine ob-
servations and follow analogies; you have to try
and try again. [31, pg. vi]
This leads us to ask:Where is the information content of logical
experimentation—the guesses, observations, and analogies—
located? In this paper, we give our attempt at answering this
question in the restricted setting where we use a first-order
language to express statements.
The standard presentation of first-order logic is as the
study of deduction in a setting with elementary (i.e., over
elements of sets) quantification. Thus our first task is to
identify a space that holds the information content of first-
order sentences. Towards this end, we build upon ideas found
in [15] which introduces a probability distribution on first-
order sentences and identifies a corresponding space. We
organize our exploration as a series of questions.
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• Is there a space that encodes the information content
of first-order sentences with fixed quantifier rank (Sec-
tion 2)? We use the observation that every first-order
sentence can bewritten in distributive normal form [12]
and identify a vector space where sentences of fixed
quantifier rank are represented as vectors.
• Is there a space for the case of sentences with arbitrary
quantifier rank (Section 3)? We will see that an infi-
nite dimensional analogue of a vector space—a Hilbert
space—is an appropriate generalization to the setting
with arbitrary quantifier rank. A first-order sentence
can be identified with a signal in this space.
• How does deduction affect the “plausibility" of a logi-
cal system (Section 4)? We can conceptualize a logical
system as carrying the “plausibility" of first-order sen-
tences. Similar to how a physical system carries an
invariant amount of energy in different forms, a logi-
cal system carries an invariant amount of “plausibility"
in different places. Under this formulation, we will see
that deduction is an entropic operation.
At this point, we will have a view of first-order logic as
“signals in space" and so can turn our attention towards the
geometry of sentences in space.
• Where is a first-order theory located (Section 5)? A the-
ory manifests itself as a subspace of a certain dimen-
sion. It turns out that a complete theory has dimension
one whereas an undecidable theory’s dimension is not
computable.
• What does orthogonal decomposition reveal about proofs
(Section 6)? We showhow a proof can be constructed by
decomposing the “plausibility" of a first-order sentence
into its orthogonal components. Counter-examples
(i.e., theorem proving) can be used to approximate a
theory from below and examples (i.e., model checking)
can be used to approximate a theory from above. An
application to assigning probabilities to first-order sen-
tences that reflect logical uncertainty and a discussion
of conjecturing will also be given.
• How much space does a first-order theory occupy (Sec-
tion 7)? We explore two aspects of a “models as bound-
ary" principle that highlight the difficulty of approx-
imating a theory. In particular, we will encounter a
familiar (edge) isoperimetric principle on the Boolean
hypercube: a theory with small “volume" (i.e., vari-
ance) can have unusually large “perimeter" (i.e., many
models).
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We emphasize that our aim in this paper is to offer a comple-
mentary perspective on first-order logic as “signals in space".
At the end of the paper, we will discuss some directions for
future work.
Preliminaries We assume familiarity with the syntax and
semantics of first-order logic, vector spaces, and basic proba-
bility theory.
As notation, we write a formula ϕ with free variables
y1, . . . ,yk as ϕ[y¯k ] or simply ϕ[y¯]. When the quantifier rank
of a sentence is important, we indicate it as ϕ(r ). Throughout
the paper, we work with a first-order language L with equal-
ity and a finite number of predicates and without constants
or function symbols.
Let 2 ≜ {0, 1}  {⊥,⊤} denote the two element set where
⊤ ≜ (∀x)x = x ∨ ¬((∀x)x = x) and ⊥ ≜ ¬⊤. Let Set(X ) ≜
2X denote the powerset of X .
2 Space: Fixed Quantifier Rank
Is there a space that encodes the information content of first-
order sentences with fixed quantifier rank? Webegin our explo-
ration of first-order logic as a space starting with the simpler
case of fixed quantifier rank. We use the observation that
every first-order sentence can be written in distributive nor-
mal form [12] and identify a vector space where sentences of
fixed quantifier rank are represented as vectors (Section 2.1).
We then examine basic properties of the vector space (Sec-
tion 2.2). Throughout this section, we restrict attention to
sentences of quantifier rank r .
2.1 Vector Space
We define a vector space for rank r sentences by identifying
a basis of rank r constituents for the vector space. Before
we review the definition of constituents, we highlight two
properties that make them a natural candidate for a basis.
Proposition 2.1 ([12]). Distributive normal form Every
formula ϕ(r )[y¯] can be written in distributive normal
form, i.e., as a disjunction
ϕ(r )[y¯] ≡
∨
δ (r )[y¯]∈dnf(ϕ(r )[y¯])
δ (r )[y¯]
where dnf : L[y¯] → Set(∆(r )[y¯]) is a function that
maps a formula (an element of L[y¯]) to a subset of
constituents (an element of Set(∆(r )[y¯])).
Mutual exclusion Any two distinct constituents δ (r )i [y¯] and
δ (r )j [y¯] are mutually exclusive, i.e., ⊨ δ (r )i [y¯] → ¬δ (r )j [y¯].
The first item captures the idea that every vector (formula)
can be expressed as a linear combination of basis vectors
(constituents) where logical or is interpreted as vector addi-
tion. The second item hints suggests an inner product for the
vector space: two formulas that denote logically distinct pos-
sibilities will be orthogonal. Thus constituents actually give
an orthogonal basis. We introduce constituents concretely
now following [12].
The intuitive idea behind the definition of a constituent
is that we would like to describe possible kinds of “logical
worlds" by enumerating descriptions of how r individuals
in the domain are related to one another uniformly in r .1 In
order to define constituents, we require (1) several auxiliary
definitions and (2) the notion of an attributive constituent.
We introduce these in turn.
Auxiliary definitions LetA[y¯] denote the set of all atomic
formula (i.e., a predicate applied to a tuple of variables) in-
volving the free variables y¯. Let B[y¯] denote the subset of
A[y¯] that mentions the last element of y¯ at least once. Let
S({ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk }) ≜ {
∧
i ∈{1, ...,k }
(±)biϕi | b1 ∈ 2, . . . ,bk ∈ 2}
be the set where an element is a conjunction of every ϕi or
its negation where (±)0ϕ ≜ ¬ϕ, and (±)1ϕ ≜ ϕ.
Attributive constituents The set of attributive constituents
Γ(r )[y¯] with free variables y¯ is defined by induction on quan-
tifier rank r .
In the base case,
Γ(0)[y¯] ≜ S(B[y¯]) .
Intuitively, a rank 0 attributive constituent with free variables
y¯ = y1, . . . ,yk describes how the individual yk relates to the
other individuals y1, . . . ,yk−1 via all the atomic formula in
the language.
In the inductive case,
Γ(r )[y¯] ≜
{
γ (0)[y¯] ∧
∧
γ [y¯ ;z]∈Γ(r−1)[y¯ ;z]
(±)s(γ [y¯ ;z])(∃Ez)γ [y¯; z]
| γ (0) ∈ Γ(0)[y¯], s : Γ(r−1)[y¯; z] → 2
}
.
The notation (∃Ez) indicates an exclusive interpretation of
quantification so that z is distinct from all other variables
in scope. For example, (∃Ez)ϕ[y¯; z] ≜ (∃z)z , y1 ∧ · · · ∧ z ,
yk ∧ ϕ[y¯; z] where x , y is shorthand for ¬(x = y). Intu-
itively, a rank r constituent with free variables y¯ describes (1)
how yk is related to each y1, . . . ,yk−1 where y¯ = y1, . . . ,yk
and (2) for every possible smaller description (i.e., a rank
r − 1 attributive constituents), whether or not an additional
individual z exists that is related to the other individuals y¯
recursively via that description.
1Notably, this method of describing possibilities yields a finite number of
finite descriptions for each quantifier rank r . In contrast, attempting to
describe possibilities by enumerating the individuals in the domain may
result in an infinite description when the domain is infinite.
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Constituents The set of rank r constituents ∆(r )[y¯] with
free variables y¯ is defined using attributive constituents as
∆(r )[y¯; z] ≜ {A[y¯] ∧ γ (r )[y¯; z]
| A[y¯] ∈ A[y¯],γ (r )[y¯; z] ∈ Γ(r )[y¯; z]} .
Thus a rank r constituent with free variables y¯; z completes
the description of a rank r attributive constituent by addition-
ally describing how each term in y¯ is related to one another.
Thus we can think of a constituent as describing a possible
kind of “logical world".
Some constituents will be unsatisfiable, and hence, de-
scribe possibilities that are impossible. The satisfiable con-
stituents, on the other hand, describe logically possibleworlds.
Proposition 2.2 ([12]). A formula ϕ(r )[y¯] is logically valid
iff its distributive normal form contains all satisfiable rank r
constituents.
Of course, it is not decidable whether or not a constituent is
satisfiable because validity of first-order statements is not
decidable. When there are no free variables, attributive con-
stituents and constituents are identical. We abbreviate ∆(r )[]
as ∆(r ). Throughout the rest of the paper, we will largely fo-
cus on the case with no free variables, i.e., sentences, unless
indicated otherwise.2
Constituents as a basis As a reminder, a (real-valued)
vector space (V ,+, ·) is a set V along with vector addition
+ : V × V → V and scalar multiplication · : R × V → V
satisfying the vector space axioms. We define a vector space
for sentences of quantifier rank r by defining the set and the
two operations.
Definition 2.3. LetV ≜ {a1δˆ (r )1 +· · ·+anδˆ (r )n | {δ (r )1 , . . . δ (r )n } ∈
Set(∆(r )),a1 ∈ R, . . . ,an ∈ R}. Define + as component-wise
addition and · as component-wise multiplication.
Proposition 2.4. V(r ) ≜ (V ,+, ·) is a vector space with zero
®0 given by the all 0 vector and additive inverse given by the
negation of the vector components.
Proof. Routine verification of the vector space axioms. □
Proposition 2.5. Constituents form a basis for V(r ).
Proof. By construction. □
Because a vector space can be described by many different
bases, we should think of constituents as the standard basis,
similar to the unit vectors of Rd .
The vector space spans all rank r first-order sentences.
Proposition 2.6. Every (rank r ) first-order sentence ϕ(r ) can
be written as
ϕ(r ) = a1δˆ
(r )
1 + . . . anδˆ
(r )
n
2A constituent δ (r )[y¯k ] is equivalent to (∃y1) . . . (∃yk )δ (r )[y¯k ]which has
a distributive normal form of rank r + k .
where dnf(ϕ(r )) = {δ (r )1 , . . . ,δ (r )n } and any non-zeroa1, . . . ,an .
Unless stated otherwise, we assumea1 = · · · = an = | dnf(ϕ(r ))|.
Proof. Every first-order sentence of rank r can be written as
a disjunction of rank r constituents (Proposition 2.1). □
As a reminder, every sentence of rank s ≤ r is equivalent
to some sentence of rank r . Thus this vector space expresses
all first-order sentences up to rank r .
2.2 Structure
We review some of the structure of the vector space in this
section.
Dimensions The number of attributive constituents of rank
r can be computed recursively as
|Γ(r )[y¯]| ≜ |Γ(0)[y¯]|2 |Γ(r−1)[y¯ ;z] |
where |Γ(0)[y¯]|, is combinatorial in the number of base pred-
icates in y¯. The number of constituents of rank r is then
|∆(r )[y¯]| ≜ |∆(0)[y¯]|2 |Γ(r−1)[y¯ ;z] |
where |∆(0)[y¯]| is combinatorial in the number of base pred-
icates in y¯. Consequently, the first-order vector space has
a super-exponential number of dimensions as a function
of quantifier rank r . Thus the vector space has astronomic
dimension. Later in Section 7, we will see how models of a
theory can be used to approximately span the theory.
Orthogonality We can define an inner product between
two vectors in the standard way:
⟨v,w⟩ ≜
∑
δ (r )∈∆(r )
vδ (r )wδ (r ) .
It is a routine exercise to check that this is an inner product.
As usual, two vector are orthogonal if their inner product is
0.
Proposition 2.7. Two vectors are orthogonal in the space if
they are logically mutually exclusive.
Proof. By Proposition 2.1. □
The converse does not hold because there can be multiple
inconsistent constituents at some quantifier rank r . In other
words, there are multiple ways to express falsehood in this
standard basis so we may have two unsatisfiable sentences
that have an inner product of 0. Note that if we remove all
inconsistent constituents of rank r from the basis, then we
end up with a basis of r -isomorphism types (e.g., see [26]).
In this case, falsehood is represented by ®0.
Gram-Schmidt Let E be an enumeration L(r ) that spans
it, i.e., every first-order sentence of rank r can be written
as a disjunction of elements from E. Given an enumera-
tion of L(r ), we can construct an enumeration that spans it
as ¬ϕ(r )1 ,ϕ(r )1 ,¬ϕ(r )1 ∧ ¬ϕ(r )2 ,¬ϕ(r )1 ∧ ϕ(r )2 ,ϕ(r )1 ∧ ¬ϕ(r )2 ,ϕ(r )1 ∧
ϕ(r )2 , . . . .
3
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δ (0)
δ (1)a
δ (2)c
...
...
δ (2)d
...
...
δ (1)b
δ (2)e
...
...
δ (2)f
...
...
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1. An illustration of a refinement treeT . Each vertex
represents a constituent and each edge indicates a refinement
relation.
Recall that the Gram-Schmidt process is a method for
constructing an orthonormal basis from a set of vectors that
spans the space. Applying the Gram-Schmidt process results
in the following basis: eˆ1 ≜ ϕ(r )1 , eˆ2 ≜ ¬ϕ(r )1 ∧ ϕ(r )2 , eˆ3 ≜
¬ϕ(r )1 ∧ ¬ϕ(r )2 ∧ ϕ(r )3 , . . . .
3 Space: Arbitrary Quantifier Rank
Is there a space for the case of sentences with arbitrary quanti-
fier rank? The case of sentences with fixed quantifier rank
suffices to illustrate the concepts that we hope to explore
in the rest of the paper. Nevertheless, for the sake of com-
pleteness, we generalize the space perspective for sentences
with fixed quantifier rank to the case where sentences have
arbitrary quantifier rank. Towards this end, we identify a
Hilbert space where first-order sentences are represented as
signals in this space.
The construction of the Hilbert space is inspired by the one
given in [15] (Section 3.1 and Section 3.2). The main differ-
ence is that we take the space view as primary whereas [15]
defines a probability distribution on first-order sentences
and derives the corresponding space.
3.1 Limits of Logical Descriptions
The intuitive difference between the fixed quantifier rank
case and the arbitrary quantifier rank case is “resolution": the
former considers descriptions of logical possibilities at a fixed
resolutionwhereas the latter considers descriptions of logical
possibilities at arbitrary resolution. It is thus natural to think
of an infinitely precise description of a logical possibility as
the limit of a sequence of increasingly finer descriptions.
Our task in this section is to formalize this intuition of the
limit of a convergent sequences of logical descriptions. The
contents of this section are rather tedious and not essential
to the rest of the paper. The high-level takeaway is that we
can associate a tree structure (Figure 1) with the set of con-
stituents ∆ ≜
⋃
r ∈N ∆(r ) where each (infinite) path (δ (r ))r ∈N
in the tree corresponds to a sequence of constituents ordered
by quantifier rank that provide increasingly finer descrip-
tions. The limiting description is the “endpoint" of the corre-
sponding path and provides an infitely precise description.
Expansion We begin by recalling a basic fact about con-
stituents and their expansion to higher quantifier rank.
Proposition 3.1 ([12]). Every rank r constituent can be writ-
ten as a disjunction of rank r + s constituents, i.e., there is an
expansion relation ≻sr : ∆(r+s) × ∆(r ) → 2 such that any δ (r )
can be expressed as
δ (r ) ≡
∨
δ (r+s )≻sr δ (r )
δ (r+s) .
Observe that a constituent can be the expansion of two
distinct constituents, in which case it is necessarily unsat-
isfiable. In symbols, if δ (r+s) ≻sr δ (r )1 and δ (r+s) ≻sr δ (r )2 then
⊭ δ (r+s).
Additionally, observe that the notion of expansion is con-
sistent with logical implication. More concretely, if δ (r+s) ≻sr
δ (r ) then ⊨ δ (r+s) → δ (r ). When δ (r+s) is satisfiable, we can
interpret it as extending the description of a logical possibil-
ity denoted by δ (r ) to account for s additional individuals. In
other words, δ (r+s) is a higher resolution description of δ (r ).
When δ (r+s) is not satisfiable, we can interpret it as an incon-
sistent description obtained by extending some description
(either consistent or inconsistent).
These two observations highlight a certain asymmetry
between satisfiable and unsatisfiable descriptions. Whereas
a satisfiable constituent is necessarily in the expansion of
another unique satisfiable constituent at a given rank due to
mutual exclusivity, an unsatisfiable constituent can be in the
expansion of any constituent. We thus have to make a choice
about how different logical impossibilities are related to one
another in order to prevent two sequences that eventually
describe logical impossibilities from merging into each other.
Logical impossibilities We use a syntactic criterion to
aid with uniquely associating constituents with their expan-
sions.3 The idea is to define a suitable notion for a constituent
δ (r ) to be a prefix of another constituent δ (r+1).
The notation
†δ (r ) ≜ {⟨(∃Ez)γ (r−1)[z]⟩γ (r−1)[z]
γ (r ) | γ
(r−1)[z] ∈ Γ(r−1)[z]}
gives the set representation of a constituent where the no-
tation ⟨·⟩γ (r−1)[z]
γ (r ) indicates that whether or not the formula
inside is negated depends on γ (r−1)[z] and γ (r ). When the
quantifier rank is 0, we have †δ (0) ≜ {⊤}. The notation δ˜ (r )
3The syntactic criterion we use is one of the conditions used in the definition
of trivial inconsistency [12]. Trivial inconsistency is a syntactic criterion
for determining whether or not a constituent is satisfiable that satisfies
a completeness property [12]: a constituent that is not satisfiable has a
quantifier rank where all of its expansions are trivially inconsistent.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for adding edges to a refinement
tree.
1: function edges(r , ξ )
2: for δ (r+1) ∈ ∆(r+1) do
3: if δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1) for some δ (r ) then
4: Add the edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) to ξ .
5: else
6: Let A ≜ {δ (r ) | δ (r+1) ≻1r δ (r )}.
7: if |A| = 0 then
8: Choose an arbitrary δ (r ) ∈ ∆(r ).
9: Add the edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) to ξ (r+1).
10: else
11: Choose an arbitrary δ (r ) ∈ A.
12: Add the edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) to ξ (r+1).
13: return ξ
indicates that we remove the deepest layer of quantification
from δ (r ), i.e., all formula involving the rank r quantifiers.4
We say that δ (r ) is a prefix of δ (r+1), written δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1),
if †γ (r ) = †γ˜ (r+1).
Proposition 3.2. 1. Every δ (r ) is a prefix of some δ (r+1).
2. If δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1) andM ⊨ δ (r+1) for someM, thenM ⊨
δ (r ).
3. If δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1) and ⊭ δ (r ), then ⊭ δ (r+1).
Proof. See appendix. □
The first item ensures that every constituent is the prefix
of some expansion constituent so that the resolution of its
description can increased. The second and third items en-
sure that prefixes are compatible with logical implication.
More concretely, the second ensures that satisfiable expan-
sions have satisfiable prefixes while the third ensures that an
unsatisfiable constituent is the prefix of some unsatisfiable
expansion.
Refinement tree Define a sequence of graphs as follows.
Let T0 ≜ (∆(0), {}) so that the vertices are the constituents
of rank 0 and no edges. Let Tr+1 ≜ Tr ∪ (∆(r+1), ξ (r+1)) with
edges ξ (r+1) ≜ edges(r , ξ (r )) where edges is defined in Algo-
rithm 1.
Definition 3.3. The graphT ≜
⋃
r ∈NTr is a refinement tree.
We say that δ (r+s) refines δ (r ) if there is a path from δ (r )
to δ (r+s) in T . We check that T is a tree with the desired
properties.
4We can see the effect that removing a layer of quantification has on a
constituent by rewriting it to only use rank 0 attributive constituents as
δ (r+1) ≡
∧
γ (r−1)[z1]∈Γ(r )[z1]
〈
(∃Ez1)γ (0)[z1] ∧ . . .
〈
∧
γ (0)[z¯r+1]∈Γ(0)[z¯r+1]
〈
(∃Ezr+1)γ (0)[z¯r+1]
〉γ (1)[z¯r ]
γ (r+1)
. . .
〉γ (r )[z1]
γ (r+1)
.
Proposition 3.4. For any r ,Tr is a tree such that ⊨ δ (s+1) →
δ (s) for any (δ (s),δ (s+1)) ∈ ξ (r ).
Proof. See appendix. □
Proposition 3.5. T is a tree such that ⊨ δ (r+1) → δ (r ) for
any (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) ∈ E.
Proof. See appendix. □
The tree structure lends itself to constructing a topology that
expresses what an initial segment of refining constituents
could converge to.
Topology Recall that we can define a topology on a tree
by defining a basis of open sets identified by finite initial
segments of the tree.5 LetΨ be the set of paths of a refinement
tree. We write δ¯ (r ) to indicate the path (δ (0), . . . ,δ (r )) in a
refinement tree. Then a basic open set has the form
Bδ (r ) ≜ {ρ ∈ Ψ | δ¯ (r ) ⊑ ρ}
where ⊑ indicates a prefix relation on refinement tree paths.
We can think of a basic open Bδ (r ) as the description of δ (r )
along with all possible ways in which that description can
be extended.
Definition 3.6. The constituent refinement space is the topo-
logical space (Ψ,O(Ψ)) where the topology O(Ψ) is gener-
ated by the basis of clopen sets
{Bδ (r ) | δ (r ) ∈ ∆(r )} .
3.2 Hilbert Space
At the end of the previous section, we obtained a topologi-
cal space on appropriate sequences of constituents. In this
section, we will use the notion of convergence given by the
topological space to define a Hilbert space that encodes sen-
tences of arbitrary quantifier rank. Towards this end, we
reintroduce metric notions to the topological space so that
we can recover a geometry.
The inner product ⟨·, ·⟩ is the fundamental metric notion
in a Hilbert space. It intuitively gives a measure of similarity
between two elements of a Hilbert space. In our case, we
have a space of paths Ψ through a refinement tree. Recall that
a path in a refinement tree describes a logical description
in finer and finer detail. Thus, if we were to measure the
similarity between two such paths, we would intuitively
weigh the difference in coarser descriptions (the big picture)
more than differences in finer descriptions (the minutiae).
This leads us to construct a Hilbert space using L2(X , µ), i.e.,
the space of square summable sequences of X weighted by a
measure µ.
Definition 3.7. Let H ≜ L2(Ψ, β) be the Hilbert space for
sentences of arbitrary quantifier rankwhere β is anymeasure
5For background on topology, we refer the reader to [28].
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on Ψ’s Borel σ -algebra. Unless stated otherwise, we assume
that β is the uniform measure, i.e., β(Bδ (r ) ) = 1|∆(r ) | .6
Recall that L2(X , µ) is a Hilbert space so H is a Hilbert space.
The Hilbert space spans all first-order sentences. Let χA(·)
be the characteristic function over the set A.
Proposition 3.8. Every first-order sentence ϕ(r ) can be writ-
ten as
ϕ(r ) =
n∑
i=1
ai χB
δ (r )i
(·)
where dnf(ϕ(r )) = {δ (r )1 , . . . ,δ (r )n } and a1, . . . ,an are non-
zero. Unless stated otherwise, we assume a1 = · · · = an =
| dnf(ϕ(r ))|.
Proof. Every first-order sentence of rank r can be written as
a disjunction of rank r constituents (Proposition 2.1). □
Thus we can think of a first-order sentence ϕ(r ) as the signal
ϕ(r ) in H.
Orthogonality The inner product ⟨·, ·⟩ is given by
⟨f ,д⟩ =
∫
f · дdβ
for f ,д ∈ H (i.e., f and д are square integrable).
Although there are an uncountable number of infinitely
precise descriptions, there is a sense in which we really only
have a denumerable handle on them.
Proposition 3.9. H has a countable basis.
Proof. Let Br ≜ {χB(r )δ | δ
(r ) ∈ ∆(r )} and B ≜ ⋃r ∈N Br .
Then B is countable and spans the space. □
We can apply Gram-Schmidt to B to obtain a orthonormal
basis.
This concludes the construction of a space for first-order
logic. For simplicity, we will largely restrict attention to the
case of fixed quantifier rank throughout the rest of the paper
as it suffices to illustrate the main ideas of what a “signals in
space" perspective might offer.
4 Plausibility
How does deduction affect the “plausibility" of a logical sys-
tem? In this section, we conceptualize a first-order space
as carrying the “plausibility" of first-order sentences (Sec-
tion 4.1). Like its physical counterpart which carries a con-
served amount of energy in various forms, a logical system
carries a conserved amount of “plausibility" in various places.
We will then see that deduction is an entropic operation (Sec-
tion 4.2). This provides an alternative explanation for the
failure of logical omniscience, i.e., why a rational agent fails
to know all the consequences of a set of axioms. We restrict
6Recall that we can uniquely extend a valuation on a clopen basis to a
measure on σ -algebra. For background on measure-theoretic probability,
we refer the reader to [23].
attention to sentences of quantifier rank less than R in this
section.
4.1 Plausibility as Energy
Energy is a concept that is fundamental to the physical world.
In particular, the law of conservation of energy states that
energy cannot be created or destroyed—it can only be con-
verted from one form into another by some physical process.
We can thus reason about the effects of physical processes
by accounting for the system’s energy.
We propose that “plausibility" is the analogous concept
of energy for a logical system. A logical system is comprised
of a single sentence.7 We define the plausibility of a logical
system ϕ to be
P(ϕ) ≜
∑
δ (R)∈∆(R)
p(δ (R))⟨δˆ (R),ϕ⟩
where p is some probability mass function on ∆(R).
We thus have the following analogy with energy:
plausibility ∼ energy
logical possibilities ∼ forms of energy .
Each logical possibility corresponds to a different form of
energy (e.g., kinetic).
The law of conservation of plausibility can then be stated
as follows: “Plausibility cannot be created or destroyed—it
can only be shifted from one logical possibility to another
by some reasoning process". As with conservation of energy,
conservation of plausibility only holds when we consider the
entire system, i.e., ⊤. We use the phrase “reasoning process"
informally to suggest that the process is not necessarily
deductive.8 Nevertheless, deduction is an essential reasoning
process and so we turn our attention towards this kind of
reasoning next.
4.2 Deduction
From the perspective of language, deduction ormodus ponens
(mp) is formulated as the inference rule ϕ1 → ϕ2,ϕ1 =⇒ ϕ2
where =⇒ transforms the left hand side to the right hand
side. From the perspective of space, mp will be formulated
as an operator.
Modus ponens as an operator We use the observation
that ϕ1 → ϕ2 is syntactic sugar for ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 to express mp
as an operator.
Definition 4.1. Define the operator MPϕ1→ϕ2 : V(R) →
V(R) asMPϕ1→ϕ2 (ϕ) ≜ (ϕ ⊖ ϕ⊥1 ) ⊕ ϕ2 where:
∧ ϕ1 ⊕ ϕ2 ≜ ∑δ (R)∈∆(R) max(⟨δˆ (R),ϕ1⟩, ⟨δˆ (R),ϕ2⟩)δˆ (R)
∨ ϕ1 ⊖ ϕ2 ≜ ∑δ (R)∈∆(R) min(⟨δˆ (R),ϕ1⟩, ⟨δˆ (R),ϕ2⟩)δˆ (R)
¬ ϕ⊥ ≜ ∑δ (R)<dnf(ϕ)⟨δˆ (R),ϕ⟩δˆ (R)
7A logical system consisting of n sentences ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is encoded as the
one sentence system ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn .
8For example, Huang [15] shows how a local Bayesian update process can
be used to update the assignment of plausibility to logical possibilities.
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The additional vector ϕ ⊖ ϕ⊥1 is ®0 when ϕ = ϕ1. Thus this
definition of mp from the space perspective additionally
keeps track of how well the antecedent to an implication
matches with the current state. It is an over approximation
of logical mp.
Analogous to how we can model the evolution of a physi-
cal system by considering the sequencing of operators that
correspond to physical processes, we canmodel the evolution
of a logical system by considering the effects of sequencing
mp operators that correspond to deductive processes.
Observe thatMPϕ1→ϕ2 is a continuous operator. We can
interpret this as another instantiation of the locality of com-
putation: Any sentence that can be deduced is a sequence of
local and small steps. As it turns out,MPϕ1→ϕ2 is “entropic"
in a sense that we describe next.
Modus ponens is entropic We begin with the observation
that mp increases plausibility of a logical system.
Proposition 4.2. P(ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕn) ≤ P(MPϕn−1→ϕn ◦ · · · ◦
MPϕ1→ϕ2 (ϕ1)).
Proof. We get thatMPϕn−1→ϕn (ϕn−1) ◦ · · · ◦MPϕ1→ϕ2 (ϕ1) =
ϕn by induction on n. It then follows that P(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn) ≤
P(ϕn) because dnf(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) ⊆ dnf(ϕn). □
Consequently, knowledge of a proof contains less plausibility
than knowledge of a theorem statement.
Intuitively, the plausibility of a logical system increases
because the number of possibilities we consider possible
after an application of mp increases. Note that this fact does
not contradict the law of conservation of plausibility. In
particular, an application of mp changes the logical system
under consideration which may no longer be the total system
⊤.
We can rephrase the increase in plausibility as an in-
crease in unnormalized entropy. Recall the unnormalized
entropy of a vector (a1, . . . ,an) is defined asU (a1, . . . ,an) ≜∑n
i=1 ai (1− log(ai )). Let ϕ‡ be the vector where ⟨δˆ (R),ϕ⟩ = 1
whenever δ (R) ∈ dnf(ϕ) and ⟨δˆ (R),ϕ⟩ = α otherwise where
α > 0.
Proposition 4.3.
U ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)‡) ≤ U ((MPϕ1→ϕ2 (ϕ1))‡)
Proof. Observe that dnf(ϕ1) ⊆ dnf((ϕ∧¬ϕ1)∨ϕ2). The result
thus follows by routine calculation. □
Because deduction increases (unnormalized) entropy, a de-
ductive process may spread out information over too many
possibilities as to render it impossible to find the proof of a
conjecture.
5 Theories
Where is a first-order theory located? As we might expect,
a first-order theory T forms a subspace. We can visualize
δˆ (r )i
δˆ (r )j
δˆ (r )k
Figure 2. A theory T (shaded in red) that is spanned by
{δˆ (r )i , δˆ (r )j }. Thus the sentence denoting the vector (blue) is
not part of the theory when δˆ (r )j is not satisfiable.
the subset of sentences T (r ) that have quantifier rank r as a
hyperplane sitting in V(r ) (Figure 2).
Proposition 5.1. Let T be some theory. Then T (r ) forms a
subspace of V(r ) for every r .
Proof. Observe that the subset of satisfiable constituents that
satisfy the theory T forms a basis for the subspace. □
Definition 5.2. The dimension of a theory is a function
D : N → N such that D(r ) gives the number of satisfiable
constituents at rank r .
The dimension of a theory has can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of its complexity. We introduce a complete theory and
an undecidable theory next to give examples of the lower
and upper limits of a theory’s complexity.
Example 5.3 (Unbounded dense linear order). The theory
of unbounded dense linear orders (UDLO) expresses the
ordering of the real line using the binary relation <.9
UDLO is a complete theory so it is intuitively “simple".
Proposition 5.4. A complete theory has dimension D(r ) = 1
the constant one function.
Proof. Let δ (r ) be some satisfiable constituent (which exists
because the theory is consistent). Then¬δ (r ) ≡ ∨δ ∈∆(r )\{δ (r ) } δ
is not satisfiable by completeness of the theory. Thus every
other constituent at rank r is not satisfiable. □
To give a flavor of what a constituent looks like, the only
satisfiable rank 1 and 2 constituents for UDLO are
1. ((∃Ex1)x1 ≮ x1) ∧ (∀Ex1)x1 ≮ x1; and
2. ((∃Ex1)x1 ≮ x1 ∧ E[x1] ∧ U [x1]) ∧ (∀Ex1)x1 ≮ x1 ∧
E[x1]∧U [x1]whereE[x1] ≜ (∃Ex2)x2 < x1∧(∃Ex2)x1 <
x2∧(∃Ex2)x2 ≮ x2 andU [x1] ≜ (∀Ex2)x2 < x1∨x1 <
x2 ∨ x2 ≮ x2
9For reference, the axioms for UDLO are: (∀x )(∀y)x < y → ¬(x = y∨y <
x ) (antisymmetry), (∀x )(∀y)(∀z)x < y ∧ y < z → x < z (transitivity),
(∀x )(∀y)x < y ∨y < x ∨x = y (trichotomy), (∀x )(∀y)x < y → (∃z)x <
z ∧ y < z (dense), and (∀x )(∃y)(∃z)y < x ∧ x < z (unbounded).
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where x ≮ y is syntactic sugar for ¬(x < y). In words,
the only satisfiable rank 2 constituent describes that either
x1 < x2 or x2 < x1, i.e., the only two possible linear orderings
involving two elements.
Example 5.5 (Groups). The theory of groups expresses
groups from abstract algebra and involves one binary opera-
tor · expressing group multiplication.10
Groups is not decidable so it is intuitively “complex".
Proposition 5.6. An undecidable theory has uncomputable
dimension.
Proof. Adecision procedure for validity of constituentswould
decide validity of first-order sentences. □
Although the dimension is not computable, we do have a
(trivial) upper-bound for the dimension of any theory given
by the number of constituents.
Proposition 5.7. The dimension U (r ) = |∆(r ) | is an upper
bound on the dimension of D of any theory.
Proof. Straightforward. □
Thus there is a super-exponential upper bound on the di-
mension of a theory as a function of quantifier rank r .
Compared to UDLO which only has one satisfiable con-
stituent at any depth, there are many satisfiable constituents
at any depth for groups. Intuitively, these constituents corre-
spond to classifying the kinds of groups that are expressible
in a first-order language. The most granular kind of group
simply satisfies the axioms, a finer kind of group differenti-
ates abelian groups from non-abelian groups, and so on.
6 Proofs
What does orthogonal decomposition reveal about proofs? We
revisit the notion of proof from the space perspective in this
section and explore what one based on orthogonal decom-
position would look like (Section 6.1). We will see that each
component can be lower bounded by a counter-example
(i.e., theorem proving) or upper bounded by an example (i.e.,
model checking) (Section 6.2). This provides an explanation
of the utility of examples to the process of proving. Finally,
we highlight an application to assigning probabilities to first-
order sentences that reflects logical uncertainty and provide
a discussion of conjecturing (Section 6.3).
6.1 Component Proofs
The idea of decomposing a signal into its orthogonal compo-
nents is one that has numerous applications in engineering
and the sciences. It is a powerful method because it enables
10For reference, the axioms of groups are: (∃e)(∀x )(x · e = x ∧ e · x =
x ) ∧ ((∃y)x · y = e ∧ y · x = e) (identity) and (∀x )(∀y)(∀z)(x · y) · z =
x · (y · z) (transitivity). Recall that we do not consider function symbols
in this paper. Thus the axioms should replace the binary operator · with a
ternary predicate M and additional formula asserting that M is a function.
one to analyze each component separately and combine the
results to obtain the behavior of the original signal. For ex-
ample, we can understand the motion of an object in a 2D
plane by separately analyzing its motion along the x-axis
and y-axis and superimpose the results.
Decomposition is similar to the usage of compositional-
ity in language where we give the meaning of a sentence
be composing the meanings of its phrases. The difference
between the two is that the former implicitly assumes the
pieces to be composed are semantically independent whereas
the latter does not. Thus we will be looking at proofs under
an additional constraint in this section.
In the case of proving, the assumption of semantic inde-
pendence means that each piece of the proof corresponds to
a distinct logical possibility, and consequently, can be tested
for satisfiability independently of one another. We formalize
this idea now.
Definition 6.1. A (rank r ) component proof system is a tuple
(B,τ , χ ) where
• B is a choice of orthogonal basis for V(r );
• τ : B → 2 is a valuation such that τ (ψ ) = 0 means
that ψ is unsatisfiable and τ (ψ ) = 1 means that ψ is
satisfiable; and
• χ : L × B → 2 is a component classifier that indi-
cates whether a sentence contains the correspond-
ing basis element as a component or not. In symbols,
χ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) = 1 if ⊨ ψ → ϕ(r ) and χ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) = 0 other-
wise. The component function is given by
χ (ϕ(r ),δ ) = δ ∈ dnf(ϕ(r ))
when B is the standard basis.
Definition 6.2. A component proof of ϕ is a sentence∧
ψ ∈B
τ (ψ ) ∧ χ (ϕ(r ),ψ )
where (B,τ , χ ) is a component proof system. Each τ (ψ ) ∧
χ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) is a component.
A priori, neither the valuation τ nor the component clas-
sifier χ are required to reflect logical validity. We say that
a valuation τ is sound if τ (ψ ) , 1 wheneverψ is not satisfi-
able and a valuation τ is complete if τ (ψ ) = 1 wheneverψ is
satisfiable. Similarly, we say that a component classifier is
sound if χ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) , 1 whenever ⊭ ψ → ϕ and a component
classifier is complete if χ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) = 1 whenever ⊨ ψ → ϕ.
Because neither the valuation nor component classifier
are required to reflect logical validity, a proof constructed in
a component proof system can exhibit error. In particular, a
component proof can be incorrect on some components and
correct on others, leading to a “partially correct" proof.
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Figure 3. An illustration of approximating a component in
a component proof. The idea is to determine each basis ele-
ment’s ground truth value by either upper or lower bounding
its value. In this example, we know the ground truth value
for the basis elementsψd andψe because the upper and lower
bounds coincide. For basis elements ψa , ψb , ψc , and ψf we
do not yet know their ground truth value.
Definition 6.3. • The error of the valuation τˆ with re-
spect to the ground truth τ is
EV ≜
∑
ψ ∈B
|τˆ (ψ ) − τ (ψ )| .
• The error of the component classifier χˆ with respect
to the ground truth χ on the sentence ϕ(r ) is
Eϕ(r ) ≜
∑
ψ ∈B
| χˆ (ϕ(r ),ψ ) − χ (ϕ(r ),ψ )| .
The total error of a component proof for ϕ(r ) is EV + Eϕ(r ) .
We say that a component proof is partially correct if it has
non-zero total error.
The error is related to the soundness and completeness of
the valuation and component classifiers in the obvious way.
Proposition 6.4. The total error EV + Eϕ(r ) = 0 for every
sentence ϕ(r ) iff both the valuation and component classifier
are sound and complete.
Proof. Straightforward. □
The notion of partial correctness is an essential difference
between a standard proof and a component proof. As a re-
minder, a standard proof is a sequence of sentences where
every sentence follows from the previous one by deduction.
One invalid proof step thus invalidates the entire proof—a
standard proof is brittle. In contrast, a component proof is
somewhat robust because each component is semantically
independent of the other. The robustness to error leads us
to consider how approximation can be used to construct a
component proof.
6.2 Approximation
The inspiration for an approximation procedure for con-
structing a component proof comes from sandwiching a
function in analysis: use a simpler family of functions to
simultaneously lower bound and upper bound the unwieldy
function of interest. In our setting, we can use the family of
characteristic functions {χδ (r ) (·) | δ (r ) ∈ ∆(r )}.
Figure 3 illustrates the idea behind the approximation
procedure for the components of a component proof. Let
Fϕ (ψ ) ≜ τ (ψ ) ∧ χ (ϕ,ψ ).
Lower bound We lower bound Fϕ (ψ ) by attempting to show
that ¬ψ is logically valid. We can use any first-order
proof system (e.g., an automated theorem prover) to
show that ¬ψ is derivable. This corresponds to show-
ing that this specific component has a counter-example.
Upper bound We upper bound Fϕ (ψ ) by (1) “choosing" a
modelM and then (2) attempting to show thatM ⊨
ψ (e.g., using a model checker). This corresponds to
showing that this specific component has an example.
The approximation procedure reveals an asymmetry in
the efficacy of lower bounding (i.e., proving) versus upper
bounding (i.e., model checking). In particular, any disjunc-
tion of unsatisfiable basis elements will be unsatisfiable as
well. Consequently, by refuting
∨
ψ ∈B ψ for some subset B
of unsatisfiable basis elements, we can eliminate |B | basis
elements in one go.
In contrast, the model checking approach can only show
that one component is satisfiable at a time due to the mutual
exclusivity of the basis. Moreover, it requires the user to de-
vise a concrete example. Consequently, from the perspective
of a component proof, it should be more effective to put more
effort into proving as opposed to model checking.
6.3 Logical Uncertainty
Intuitively, we would expect proving and assigning logical
uncertainty—assessing how probable a conjecture is—to be
related tasks. For instance, wemight believe that a conjecture
is more likely to be true than false even when we have no
clear path for proving it.
In this section, we show how an approximation procedure
for constructing component proofs gives rise to a probabil-
ity distribution on first-order sentences such that logically
equivalent sentences are not necessarily assigned the same
probability. This provides another take on the failure of logi-
cal omniscience that complements the one given in Section 4
where we saw that deduction was an entropic operation. We
begin by introducing a representation of a theorem proving
agent’s knowledge.
Representation Let refute : L → 2 be a function that
soundly approximates the deduction relation, i.e., refute(ϕ) =
⊤ implies that ⊭ ϕ. We can think of refute(ϕ) as a resource-
bound prover. Similarly, let checkM L → 2 be a function
that soundly approximates amodel checker, i.e., checkM(ϕ) =
⊤ implies thatM ⊨ ϕ. As before, we can think of checkM(ϕ)
as a resource-bound model checker.
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Suppose we have sentences ϕF1 , . . . ,ϕFN that are known to
be false, knowledge of modelsM1, . . . ,MM , and sentences
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL whose satisfiability is not known. We can inter-
pret ¬ϕF1 , . . . ,¬ϕFN as theorems,M1, . . . ,MM as common
examples, ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL as conjectures that are specific to the
agent. (We will see why we include conjectures momentar-
ily.) Let ϕ0 ≜
∧N
i=1 ϕ
F
i . Let Ni j ≜ 1 when refute(ϕi → ϕ j ) =
⊤ and
Ni j ≜
|{Mk | 0 ≤ k ≤ M, checkMk (ϕi → ϕ j ) = ⊤}|
M + α
otherwise where 0 ≤ i ≤ L, 0 ≤ j ≤ L, and α > 0.
Definition 6.5. The matrix
K ≜
©­­­­­­«
ϕ0 ϕ1 ϕ2 ... ϕL
ϕ0 1 1 1 . . . 1
ϕ1 N10 1 N12 . . . N1L
ϕ2 N20 N21 1 . . . N2L
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
ϕL NL0 NL1 NL2 . . . 1
ª®®®®®®¬
represents the knowledge of an agent A.
Each row and column of the matrix is associated with
the sentences F ,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL . Each entry of the matrix can be
thought of as the probability that the row sentenceϕr implies
the column sentence ϕc , i.e., Nrc ≈ Pr(⊨ ϕr → ϕc ). Thus
the first row of the matrix is all 1 (because false statements
imply any statement) and the first column of the matrix
gives the probability that the given sentence is false (i.e.,
Nr0 ≈ Pr(⊭ ϕr )). Note that Ni j , Njk in general (unless we
have an iff), and consequently, we should not think of the
matrix K as a covariance matrix. Nevertheless, there is a
sense in which we can think of each entry as a measure of
logical overlap, i.e., logical correlation.
Conjectures Consider the subspace of V(r ) spanned by
B ≜ {F ,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL} where r is the maximum rank of all
the sentences involved. We call B a conjecturing basis.
In general, B will not be (1) linearly independent nor (2)
contain ⊤. In the setting of first-order logic, the first is not
an issue for the purpose of determining validity. The sec-
ond, however, is problematic because it means that there are
certain sentences whose validity an agent will not be able
to determine unless it considers alternative conjectures. We
can thus view conjecturing from the perspective of linear
algebra as finding a useful conjecturing basis.
An application of principal component analysis (pca) to K
gives an ordering on the agent’s conjectures with respect to
K ’s eigenvalues. Because the matrix K is constructed with
respect to the satisfiability of an agent’s models, we can inter-
pret the sentences with the lowest eigenvalues as those that
have no known examples to the sentences with the highest
eigenvalues as those with no known counterexamples. Thus
there is an exploration versus exploitation tradeoff in deter-
mining which conjectures to invest time in. An agent that
wishes to explore should invest in the sentences with the
smallest eigenvalues while an agent that wishes to exploit
should invest in the sentences with the largest eigenvalues.
Beliefs and probabilities We return to the problem of
defining probabilities on sentences, starting with a proxy for
them.
Definition 6.6. An agent with knowledge K has belief
B(ϕi ) ≜ 1 − Ni0 .
Note that an agent’s beliefs do not represent probabilities
because they are not normalized.
Although an agent’s beliefs are not probabilities, they can
be converted into them.
Definition 6.7. Define a valuation on basic opens by on
induction on quantifier rank r as ν (Bδ (0) ) ≜ 1 and
ν (Bδ (r+1) ) ≜

0 ν (Bδ (r ) ) = 0
B(δ (r+1))∑
δ (r+1)∈child(δ (r )) B(δ (r+1))
ν (Bδ (r ) ) otherwise
where δ (r ) is parent of δ (r+1) and child(δ (r )) denotes δ (r )’s
children nodes.
Proposition 6.8. ν defines unique probability measure on Ψ.
Proof. We see that ν defines a valuation on the basic clopens
of Ψ such that ν (Bδ (r ) ) =
∑
δ (r+1)∈child(δ (r+1)) ν (Bδ (r+1) ) for any
δ (r ) by induction on r . Thus we can extend this to a measure
in the usual way. □
Because an agent only has a finite amount of knowledge,
it follows that an agent’s probabilities are not logically om-
niscient.
Proposition 6.9 (Failure of logical omniscience). There are
agents that are not logically omniscient.
Proof. Consider the agent with matrixK = (1) and knows no
models. Then it assigns positive probability to unsatisfiable
constituents so it cannot be logically omniscient. □
7 Size
How much space does a first-order theory occupy? In this
section, we explore two views of a “models as boundary"
principle that highlight the difficulty of approximating a the-
ory. In the first, we view distinct models as spanning the
theory and quantify the accuracy of approximation as a func-
tion of the number of distinct models (Section 7.1). In the
second, we view the valuation for some theory’s basis as a
Boolean hypercube (Section 7.2). A familiar (edge) isoperi-
metric principle then says that a theory with small “volume"
(i.e., ‘variance) can still have large “perimeter" (i.e., many
models).
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7.1 Approximate Spanning
The first view we have of “models as boundary" is that a
theory’s models span it. Intuitively, knowledge of distinct
models suffices to describe the theory because each model
describes exactly one basis element. It then follows that
the number of distinct models we require as a function of
quantifier rank is exactly the dimension of the theory.
How many models do we need to approximately span a
theory? As it turns out, it depends on how we represent
what we know to be true. Let ⊤U ≜ ∑δ (r )∈∆(r ) 1|∆(r ) | ˆδ (r )
be a representation of truth for an uninformed agent. Let
⊤O = ∑δˆ (r )∈∆(r ) |+ 1D(r ) δˆ (r ) where ∆(r ) |+ are the satisfiable
constituents of rank r be a representation of truth for an
omniscient agent.
Proposition 7.1. 1. There exist k sentences ϕ(r )1 , . . . ,ϕ
(r )
k
such that
∥⊤U − 1
k
k∑
j=1
ϕ(r )j ∥2 ≤
√
2
k |∆(r ) | .
2. There exist k sentences ϕ(r )1 , . . . ,ϕ
(r )
k such that
∥⊤O − 1
k
k∑
j=1
ϕ(r )j ∥2 ≤
√
2
kD(r ) .
Proof. 1. Let {δ (r )1 , . . . ,δ (r )N } = ∆(r ). The set {
∑N
i=1 ai δˆ
(r )
i |
a1, . . . aN ∈ [0, 1/|∆(r ) |]} forms a convex subset of
V(r ) with diameter
√
2/|∆(r ) | that contains ⊤U .11 The
result follows by an application of the approximate
Catheodory theorem.
2. Similar to item 1.
□
At first blush, it appears that a theory can be “accurately"
spanned by a constant number of models independent of its
dimension. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that logical
validity is brittle no matter how it is represented—being off
by any ϵ > 0 is enough to lose it.
Comparing the results for ⊤U versus ⊤O , we see that it is
easier to approximate ⊤U than it is to approximate ⊤O (i.e.,
smaller k) because D(r ) ≤ |∆(r ) |. Put another way, it is easier
to approximate the beliefs of an uninformed agent compared
to the beliefs of an omniscient agent.
Our ability to approximate is different if we know models
of a theory.
11The diameter of a convex set S is sup{ ∥x − y ∥2 | x, y ∈ S }.
Proposition 7.2. LetM1 ⊨ ϕ(r )1 , . . . ,Mk ⊨ ϕ(r )k be k distinct
models of a theory that satisfy some ϕ(r ). Then
∥⊤U − ϕ(r )∥2 ≤
√
|∆(r ) |2 − 2N |∆(r ) | + N 2
N |∆(r ) |2
∥⊤O − ϕ(r )∥2 ≤
√
D(r )(D(r ) − 2k) + kN
ND(r )2
where ϕ(r ) ≜
∑
δ (r )∈dnf(ϕ(r ))
1
N δ
(r ) and N = | dnf(δ (r ))|.
Proof. By direct calculation. □
Let us unpack the assertion. Observe that when an agent
has uninformative beliefs, the error depends on how well
ϕ(r ) approximates the k known models. When an agent has
omniscient beliefs, we have that the information content
of a theory is approximately encoded by its models, i.e., its
examples. Intuitively, this makes sense as the more distinct
kinds of models that one knows, the better the approximation
to the ground truth.
Example 7.3. For a complete theory, we have D(r ) = 1.
Thus the above result says that we have maximal error if
we know no models and zero error if we know a model. For
instance, we can fully describe a complete theory like UDLO
with either the models (R, <) or (Q, <).
Example 7.4. When D(r ) is unknown as in the case of an
undecidable theory, then the quality of approximation de-
pends on the theory. If D(r ) ≫ k , then the error term is
essentially 1/√N . Another way to put this is that if one
knows only a few examples of “complex" theory, then ϕ(r )
should be chosen so that leaves as many possibilities as open
in order to obtain a good approximation.
7.2 Hypercube Isoperimetric Principle
The second view of “models as boundary" takes inspiration
from the Boolean hypercube and Boolean Fourier analysis
(e.g., see [29]). The basic idea is that we view the valuation
for some theory’s basis as a Boolean hypercube with vertices
labeled according to whether they are satisfiable or not. We
make this concrete now.
Hypercube A labeled Boolean hypercube of dimension N
is a tuple (V ,E, ℓ) where V ≜ 2N is a set of vertices of the
length N bit-strings, E ≜ {{x ,y} | d(x ,y) = 1} is a set of
edge containing those bit-string with Hamming distance
one (i.e., d(x ,y) = |{n | xn , yn}|), and ℓ : V → {−1, 1} is
a labeling that assigns to each vertex a Boolean value. We
write x¬i to indicate that we flip the i-th bit in the bit-string
x . A boundary edge along the i-th dimension is then any
x such that ℓ(x) , ℓ(x¬i ). The influence at coordinate i of
f : 2N → {−1, 1} is
Infi [f ] ≜
∑
x ∈V
1
2N
[f (x) , f (x¬i )]
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where the notation [·] indicates an Iverson bracket gives the
fraction of boundary edges along the i-th dimension. The
total influence Inf[f ] ≜ ∑Ni=1 Infi [f ] then gives the total
fraction of boundary edges.
Our next task is to associate each bit-string with a con-
stituent. Recall that a constituent has the form
δ (r )s ≜
∧
γ [z]∈Γ(r−1)[z]
(±)s(γ [z])(∃Ez)γ [z]
where s : Γ(r−1)[z] → 2. Thus a constituent can be identi-
fied with a bit-string of length |Γ(r−1)[z]| corresponding to
s which forms a vertex of a Boolean hypercube of dimen-
sion |Γ(r−1)[z]|. A valuation on τ : ∆(r ) → {−1, 1} where
τ (δ (r )) = −1 if δ (r ) is satisfiable and τ (δ (r )) = 1 otherwise is
then a labeling for the constituent hypercube.12
A boundary edge along the i-th dimension on the con-
stituent hypercube corresponds to onewhere changingwhether
or not an individual that satisfies the i-th constituent of rank
r − 1 exists or not flips the valuation. In other words, we
have a boundary edge if we cross between those constituents
with models and those without models. As we will see next
through a familiar edge isoperimetric principle, the number
of crossings can be quite large even if the theory has small
variance (i.e., small “volume").
Edge isoperimetric principle We begin by calculating the
variance of a theory’s valuation τ .
Proposition 7.5.
Var[τ ] = 1 −
( |∆(r ) | − 2D(r )
|∆(r ) |
)2
.
Proof. We have E[τ ] = D(r )|∆(r ) | −
|∆(r ) |−D(r )
|∆(r ) | and E[τ 2] =
D(r )
|∆(r ) | +
|∆(r ) |−D(r )
|∆(r ) | = 1. The result follows by routine calculation. □
We obtain edge isoperimetric principles by recalling two
classic results from Boolean Fourier analysis.
Proposition 7.6. We have
• Var[τ ] ≤ Inf[τ ] (Poincare’s inequality [29, pg. 36]) and
• Ω
(
logn
n
)
Var[τ ] ≤ maxi Infi [f ] (KKL theorem [29, pg.
260]).13
Example 7.7. For a complete theory, the variance is 4|∆(r ) | (1−
1
∆(r ) )which is essentially zero. Observe that every coordinate
is influential so that Inf[τ ] = maxi Infi [τ ] = 1.
8 Related Work
The primary building blocks for this paper come from Hin-
tikka’s work on distributive normal forms [12–14] andHuang’s
work [15] on using them to assign probabilities to first-order
12We follow the convention that −1 7→ 1 and 1 7→ 0 when converting
between {−1, 1} and 2 (e.g., see [29]).
13As a reminder, Ω(·) is an asymptotic lower-bound.
sentences. Due to the nature of our exploration, we have
also touched upon a variety of topics in bits and pieces. We
highlight related work in some of the areas that we touch
upon so we can compare and contrast perspectives.
Logic and geometry The connections between logic and
geometry have been recognized in the literature, toposes
being a prime example (e.g., see [24]). Our approach is more
specialized and concrete as we work with first-order logic
directly and look at as a linear space.
High-dimensional phenomena such as phase transitions
(e.g., see [9]) and isoperimetric principles (e.g., see [29]) have
also been considered in the context of propositional logic. We
explored some high-dimensional phenomena for first-order
logic.
Logical uncertainty Logical uncertainty and the problem
of logical omniscience is a problem of interest in philosophy
(e.g., see [3, 11, 30, 35]) and there have been many solutions
proposed for addressing it. One approach proposes assigning
probabilities to sentences such that logically equivalent state-
ments are not necessarily assigned the same probability (e.g.,
see [8] and [15]).14 Another approach syntactically models
an agent’s knowledge (e.g., see [6] and [7]). A third approach
models an agent’s reasoning ability as bounded (e.g., see [18]
and [1]). Our approach has aspects of all three. We model the
agent’s knowledge directly and show how it leads to prob-
abilities that fail logical omniscience. We explain bounded
rationality by the entropic nature of deduction.
Conjecturing A popular approach for automatic conjec-
ture generation is based on enumerating candidate sentences
and pruning the list using heuristics (e.g., the shape of the
sentence) and model-checking (e.g., keep sentences that have
no known counter-example) [2, 4, 10, 25]. We suggest using
pca with respect to an agent’s knowledge, which is con-
structed with model-checking, as a heuristic. Huang [15]
proposes conjecturing as hypothesis selection with respect
to a probability distribution on first-order sentences.
9 Conclusion
In summary, we explored some consequences of a shift in
perspective to “signals in space" for first-order logic. We
close with some thoughts on what a signal perspective of
first-order logic provides to guide further research.
One view of the signal encoding of sentences seen in this
paper is that it provides another reduction of first-order
logic to a propositional setting. It would be interesting to see
how techniques typically applied in the propositional setting
apply to the representation of first-order logic introduced
here. In particular, we have already seen examples of how
Boolean Fourier analysis apply in this paper.
14There are also approaches focused on assigning probabilities to sentences
(e.g., see [5] and [34] for first-order sentences and [17] for higher-order
sentences).
12
Elementary Logic in Linear Space Preprint, Under Review, January 10, 2020
A second view of the signal encoding is that it provides
another information theoretic take on first-order logic that
counts semantic possibilities as opposed to syntactic aspects
of the sentences themselves. It would be interesting to see
what other aspects of first-order logic that information the-
oretic ideas can reveal in addition to the one we saw that
deduction is entropic.
Lastly, we saw how a signal perspective enables orthog-
onal decomposition, a technique that is essential in the sci-
ences and statistical inference more generally, to be applied
to a logical system. Thus the ideas in this paper may be
useful in illuminating the application of machine learning
to theorem proving (e.g., see [15, 16, 19–22, 27, 36]). In par-
ticular, the “models as boundary" principle highlights the
difficulty of approximating a theory and so we have a “nega-
tive" result. On a more encouraging note, we have seen how
model-checking and theorem proving can be combined in a
principled manner to construct a theorem prover.
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A Appendix
Proposition A.1 (Proposition 3.2). 1. Everyδ (r ) is a pre-
fix of some δ (r+1).
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2. If δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1) andM ⊨ δ (r+1) for someM, thenM ⊨
δ (r ).
3. If δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1) and ⊭ δ (r ), then ⊭ δ (r+1).
Proof. 1. When r = 0, then δ (0) is the prefix of every
δ (1). Suppose r ≥ 1. Observe that |{δ˜ (r+1) | δ (r+1) ∈
∆(r+1)}| = 3 |Γ(r−1)[z1] | because the third possibility for
a deletion is that it contains both γ (r−1)[z1] and its
negation. Meanwhile |∆(r ) | = 2 |Γ(r−1)[z1] | . The result
follows by the pigeonhole principle.
2. We have M ⊨ ⟨γ (r )[z1]⟩γ
(r )[z1]
γ (r+1) for every γ
(r )[z1] ∈
†δ (r+1) becauseM ⊨ δ (r+1). Moreover, we haveM ⊨
⟨γ (r−1)[z1]⟩γ
(r−1)[z1]
δ (r ) for everyγ
(r−1)[z1] ∈ †δ (r ) because
δ (r ) ⊑ δ (r+1). ThusM ⊨ δ (r ) as desired.
3. Similar to item 2.
□
Proposition A.2 (Proposition 3.4). For any r , Tr is a tree
such that ⊨ δ (s+1) → δ (s) for any (δ (s),δ (s+1)) ∈ ξ (r ).
Proof. By induction on r . The base case is trivial. In the induc-
tive case, we have that Tr is a tree such that ⊨ δ (s) → δ (s+1)
for any (δ (s),δ (s+1)) ∈ ξ (r ). In order to show that Tr+1 is a
tree, it suffices to show that every δ (r ) ∈ ∆(r ) has an outgo-
ing edge and every δ (r+1) ∈ ∆(r+1) has a unique incoming
edge (because of the inductive hypothesis). This follows from
Proposition 3.2 item 1 and the definition of edges.
It remains to show that ⊨ δ (s) → δ (s+1) for any (δ (s),δ (s+1)) ∈
ξ (r+1). By the inductive hypothesis, it suffices to show that
⊨ δ (r ) → δ (r+1) for any (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) ∈ ξ (r+1). We proceed by
case analysis on the edge set following the cases in Algo-
rithm 1.
Suppose there is an edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) such that δ (r ) ⊑
δ (r+1). If δ (r+1) is not satisfiable then there is nothing to
show. If δ (r+1) is satisfiable then δ (r ) is satisfiable as well
by Proposition 3.2 item 2. Thus ⊨ δ (r+1) → δ (r ).
Suppose there is an edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) such that δ (r ) ⊁1r
δ (r+1). Then δ (r+1) is necessarily unsatisfiable so there is
nothing to show.
Suppose there is an edge (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) such that δ (r ) ≻1r
δ (r+1). Then the result follows as ≻sr respects implication. □
Proposition A.3 (Proposition 3.5). T is a tree such that ⊨
δ (r+1) → δ (r ) for any (δ (r ),δ (r+1)) ∈ E.
Proof. Consider the set {Tr | r ∈ N} ∪ {T } ordered by
subgraph inclusion. We show that every chain C has an
upper bound, namely
⋃
t ∈C t . Let δ (r ) be some vertex of⋃
t ∈C t . Then it is in some Tr so it is identified by a unique
path because Tr is a tree by Proposition 3.4. Moreover, let
(δ (r ),δ (r+1)) be some edge of⋃t ∈C t . Again, it is an edge of
some Tr so that ⊨ δ (r+1) → δ (r ) as desired. By Zorn’s lemma,
there is a maximal element which in this case is exactly
T . □
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